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Abstract   
Is war beginning to escape human control? Thucydides tells us the war is one of the 
things that makes us definitively human; but how long will this continue to be the 
case as our relationship with technology continues to develop? Kenneth Waltz’s book 
Man, the State and War affords one-way of answering that question.  So too does 
Nikolaas Tinbergen’s framework for understanding human behaviour and Bruno 
Latour’s Actor Network Theory (ANT).  The main focus of this article is the extent to 
which we will diminish or enhance our own agency as human beings, especially 
should when we come to share the planet with an intelligence higher than our own. 
 
Keywords   
war, technology, Image, origins, mechanisms, ontogeny, function, actor network theory, 
Artificial Intelligence (AI), Waltz, Thucydides, Tinbergen, Latour. 
 
 
Introduction 
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There is a very real prospect that the character of war is changing faster than many of us 
imagine; that autonomous weapons systems will soon be making their own targeting 
decisions, and that soldiers will be co-existing in the field with the next generation of military 
robots.  All of this would probably have amazed the great historian Thucydides who famously 
called war to anthropon, the ‘human thing’.  It was, in fact, the only definition that he was 
willing to volunteer.  War throws a light on what we still call ‘human nature’: often the things 
that men do in war is what war has done to them.  Even the bravest soldiers may be 
traumatised by what they do or witness on the battlefield, and rarely are their enemies 
beyond the reach of human understanding or compassion. For that reason war has been 
rooted from the beginning in the bitter and unyielding experience of being human.  
 
This article sets out to discuss what it may mean to be human in a world in which machines 
have become collaborators, not tools. Like his fellow Greeks, Thucydides thought of humans 
in binomial terms: the difference between us and (other) animals, between men and women, 
and the ‘civilised’ and the ‘barbarous’.  Binomial thinking, of course, is merely a way of 
organising information – it is useful in the historical setting in which it is useful, and it is not 
useful in others.  But what is interesting is that the Greeks did not distinguish between man 
and machine, in part because they had no concept of ‘technology’. In the modern age it has 
become one of the most important concepts of all, as too has the distinction which people 
often draw between man and machine – a distinction which is becoming increasingly blurred. 
We are already witnessing the first tentative steps towards the coming post-human amalgam 
of human and machine, the confrontation and conflation of which remains a central theme of 
science fiction.  
 
The post-human implies just another step in our evolution in one of three principal ways (1) 
we may find ourselves eventually displaced as the most intelligent species on the planet – at 
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some point machines may be able to reproduce and reprogram themselves, at which stage 
we may have to talk of the evolution of the first post – biological lifeforms on the planet. (2) 
We are also edging towards automated evolution. Darwinian selection is described as being 
random, purposeless, dumb and godless; automated evolution, by contrast, is targeted, 
purposeful and intelligent – we are behind it. (3) We are also seeing the fusing of humanity 
and machine. In the military field the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) plans to improve human performance on the battlefield – on the one hand, re-
engineering soldiers through pharmacology (drug use), neuroscience (brain implants) and 
molecular biology (re-engineering the human body); and on the other, investing in advanced 
robotics, machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI).  The two we are told, will be 
increasingly imbricated: reconfigured soldiers will partner with increasingly intelligent, 
autonomous machines. (Imbricate, by the way, is just a fancy term for describing how things 
overlap.) But more than overlapping may be involved. Humans and machines won’t be 
overlapping, as much as fusing: allowing a soldier for example to access information directly 
into the brain through neural implants rather than having to use a computer screen.   
 
Can all this be regarded as an extension of our humanity, a performance upgrade, or is it a 
threat to the control of our own future? Are we fusing with technology or about to be replaced 
by it?  Eventually will we have to coexist with machines on their terms, not ours; and how 
long will it be before they cease to be tools and instead become collaborators? Above all, 
what are the implications of the changing relationship between man and machine for the 
understanding of war in the discipline of International Relations? 
 
Waltz and Human Nature 
International Relations began life by studying why states went to war.  Kenneth Waltz’s 
seminal book Man, the State and War provides one of the clearest explanations. From the 
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date of its publication in 1959 it rapidly became what it has remained ever since, an 
unassailable classic.  And Waltz broke new ground looking at its causes from three different 
angles or ‘images’ – a term different from the one with which most students are familiar, 
‘levels of analysis.’  Two of those images were ‘society’ and ‘system;’’ the first was human 
nature. All three by the way can be thought of (to use Michael Howard’s term) as ‘the 
Thucydidean coordinates’: fear, interest and honour. In Waltz’s schema war was made 
possible by our predisposition to be fearful of others – the famous security dilemma; by the 
state as a political community (or the expression of a political interest), and system of states, 
the ‘anarchical world’ that we humans have forged. As Steven Pinker explained in The Blank 
Slate all that we have to deter others from attacking us in a state of nature is honour, or 
reputation. Forfeit that and you are asking for trouble. 1  
 
It is a persuasive thesis but of course it is only as persuasive as the knowledge from both 
science (including social science) and the humanities (including history) that underpin it. I 
want to go back to basics, to Waltz’s first image: his fundamental understanding of human 
nature. An image, he wrote in the preface to the 2001 edition of his book, suggests that one 
views the world in a certain way, one forms a picture in the mind. 2 But there are several 
problems with the term images, at least as metaphorically understood.  An image marks the 
freezing of an instant.  And images on photographic paper have a habit of slowly becoming 
visible, of emerging into the light.  And I would suggest that the same is true of Waltz’s 
understanding of human nature.  It is frozen in a particular moment – the time of writing – 
and since then in our understanding of our own humanity much has come to light.  
 
Let us recall that in 1959 when Waltz’s book came out, we thought we knew what it meant to 
be human: only we could think; only we could play games like chess or Go, only we could fly 
a plane, or compose music, or invent a mathematical law.  We have spent the past 60 years 
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discovering that none of these things are unique to us.  Computers can now fly planes 
without us, and can now beat us at chess. Back in 1959 Waltz was dealing with a world in 
which the parameters of science were still limited.  In those days philosophers of the mind 
took it for granted that they had nothing to learn from science.  Daniel Dennett’s book 
Content and Consciousness (1969) was the first salvo in the battle to open the philosophy of 
mind to scientific findings, a battle that has now been effectively won. 3 Today the scope of 
what we can address scientifically has increased exponentially; science now underlies our 
understanding of the psychology of moral judgement, religious belief, creativity and emotion 
– in short it has completely changed our understanding of the human experience.  Even in 
the case of moral philosophy cognitive science is providing new insights into the 
psychological and neurological mechanisms that underlie everyday moral reasoning.  In 
short, since 1959 we have discovered that we are not as unique as we used to think.   
 
All of which is reshaping our understanding of ‘the human’.  I think this was summed up best 
by the late Richard Rorty:  
 
… the Greek description of our situation presupposes that humanity itself has an 
intrinsic nature – that there is something unchangeable called ‘the human’ … 
Pragmatism sets aside this presupposition and urges that humanity is an open-ended 
notion, that the word ‘human’ names a fuzzy but promising project rather than an 
essence. 4 
 
To use an academic term, we are a ‘work in progress’. 
 
Why is War the ‘Human Thing’?  
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So, let us go back to basics – let us ask what makes war human.  Why we are the only 
species on the planet to wage war?  It is often claimed that other species do too: think of 
ants or the higher primates.  But as I hope to make clear only we wage war in the way we do 
and that this makes all the difference.  To understand why I want to visit the work of the 
Dutch ethologist Nikolaas Tinbergen, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology in 
1973.  Tinbergen drew up a framework to help us understand every form of animal 
behaviour.  He encouraged us to ask four questions that are as relevant to war as to 
everything else we do. 
 
1. What are its origins: how did it first arise? 
2. What are the mechanisms which allow it to flourish? 
3. What is its ontogeny – its historical evolution across time? 
4. What is its function: its adaptive significance (i.e., the role of behaviour in 
facilitating reproductive success)? 
 
Let me apply all four elements of the framework to one of the central features of war: the 
way in which human beings are willing to die to defend their territory.  
 
Origins  
In Man, the State and War Waltz was much exercised over the great question of the 1950s: 
Were our ancestors as violent and vicious as Hobbes suggested, or had they been corrupted 
by property and agriculture, as proposed by Rousseau?  Today, the smart money is on 
Hobbes.  As Steven Pinker, John Gray and others argue, I think realistically, the state of 
nature is as good a picture of our origins as we could ask for. And there is mounting 
evidence writes Timothy Taylor, that we are not the only hominid species to have invented 
war.  Some historians think that the very first tools used 2.6m years ago were quite possibly 
weapons. 5 
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One of the reasons humans migrated across the world was to find new resources which 
didn’t need to be defended against others. War was the default mode. War began when 
there was nowhere else to flee.  And the defence of scarce resources only became thinkable 
writes Edward Wilson, when the energy saved in territorial defence outweighed the energy 
expended in the risk of injury and death in defending it. 6 More than just the defence of 
resources is involved; we invest, and always have done, a great deal of energy in defending 
the homes of our ancestors, as well as the ‘spirit of place’ (the home of local spirits and 
gods).  
 
But there is an additional factor in play.  Montesquieu famously proposed that war arose not 
from ordinary aggression or occasional marauding, but when the weak defender hit upon the 
idea of organised resistance.  But if you can organise the defence of your own territory, you 
can also organise a raid on someone else’s. Aristotle famously defined war as ‘the hunting of 
people and possession.’   ‘How do we organise the Defense Department for manhunts,’ 
asked Donald Rumsfeld at the beginning of the War on Terror, and some see drone warfare 
as man-hunting on a global scale.  It is a profession that now has its own technocratic 
jargon, derived in part from social network analysis and nexus topography, a pseudo-science 
which enables us to map the social environments that bind individuals together, and thus to 
identify – and also take out – the critical nodes in a network (such as terrorist cells). 
 
Mechanisms  
In 1917 the poet Edward Thomas was asked why, at the age of thirty-seven he had enlisted.  
He knelt down, scooped up a handful of English soil, and replied, ‘literally for this’.  The 
defence of territory is the oldest cause of war, but by the early the twentieth century it had 
become bound up with nineteenth century romanticism and nationalist ideology. It had gone 
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ideational. Like the traumatised war veteran of Virginia Woolf’s novel Mrs Dalloway, Thomas 
joined up “to save an England which consisted almost entirely of Shakespeare’s plays”.  
 
The mechanisms that allow war to flourish are many: literature, history, theology and 
philosophy and above all myth making to which all four can give rise. But it’s important not to 
mistake mechanisms, of course, for origins.  Take La Rochefoucauld’s notorious remark that 
no-one would fall in love if they had not first read about it.  He was referring, by the way, to 
romantic love, which we used to be told by historians was an invention of the 13th century.  
Henry Fink (1887) even dated its advent to May 1, 1274, when the young Dante fell head 
over heels in love with Beatrice. 7  No-one can claim that the Greeks only went to war after 
reading Homer, but Nietzsche was on to something with his claim that Homer ‘spiritualised 
away the cruelty’.  He turned war into literature and Homer packs a punch even today.  The 
Iliad is still the most famous of the ‘great homicidal classics’ (as Tom Stoppard engagingly 
calls them). Eight English translations have appeared this century.  
 
And the great classics, in turn betray our biological origins. Natural selection has front – 
loaded storytelling. We spend a great deal of our lives locked in fictional worlds – 
daydreaming, reading novels, and constructing life-narratives like Walter Mitty. ‘Neverland is 
our evolutionary niche,’ writes one evolutionary psychologist.  Most of us spend far more 
time in the imagined than the real world, both awake and asleep. 8 Stories help us to 
influence people: they get us to see solutions; they encourage us when we are down.  
Aristotle famously distilled the art of communication down to three basic tools: ethos, the 
bond you create with your audience; pathos, the emotional connection, and logos, the force 
of your argument. What he intuited we now know to be true: what they have found at 
Princeton is that thanks to neural coupling the same parts of the brain are energised in the 
teller and listener at the same time which makes for a high degree of social bonding. 9 
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Literature has an especially adaptive function – in providing us with role models and inspiring 
tales of heroism, it tells us that life is there to be lived in a higher emotional register than we 
can often find in times of peace.  Seamus Heaney called poetry ‘a transformative vision of 
reality’: it reveals genuine features of reality hitherto hidden, even though it is adopted 
through a conscious act of the imagination.  But how, of course, do we know when a 
transformational path reveals hidden realities (if they are there to be found); and which of 
those realities is truth-tracking, and which leads to error. Mark Twain probably had a point 
when he said that the American South had been infected by the ‘Sir Walter Scott disease’. In 
other words, the South’s dedication to the ideals that are associated with Scott’s novels such 
as chivalry and honour helped shape its identity with fatal results in the run-up to the Civil 
War. Storytelling can be dangerously misleading. 
 
But the good news is this: we may have a hard-wired predisposition to aggression and 
violence, but we can adjust our behaviour and reaction to reinforcement.  We can generate a 
range of behaviours other than war and these can be reinforced with positive rewards (such 
as the removal of an aversion stimulus – pain).  Storytelling allows us to prosecute war with 
a vengeance but of course we can also talk ourselves out of war by telling ourselves a 
different set of stories, more life-affirming than the great ‘homicidal classics’.   
 
Ontogeny  
When it comes to the ontogeny of war, Edward Thomas was fighting for a nation-state.  The 
defence of territory since chiefdom societies first transformed into states, has been state-
centric.  The socio-biologist Edward Wilson places much emphasis on the concept of 
hypertrophy: the extensive development of a pre-existing structure.  And the similarities 
between states, both agricultural and industrial, pre-modern and modern are as striking as 
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the many variations.  They merely become more complex over time.  States are an excellent 
example of what sociologists call a ‘thick’ institution with collective rituals, sacred stories, 
initiation rites, flags and symbols, even different emotional registers and moral ecologies; 
and heroes who rescue it from the brink of disaster, often just in time; and of course, a 
language that keeps outsiders in their proper place – outside.  We should think of 
nationalism as merely a particularly vivid example of a culturally marked outgrowth of 
tribalism. The central difference between a tribe and a nation is that a tribe relies largely on 
kinship; a nation on affinity – on an extended family for which one is willing to die even if one 
never meets most of its members.   
 
Functions  
The function of war is to serve itself. It is not functional, of course in the Durkheimian sense 
like an incest taboo. It’s functional in a sociological sense: it works, which is why it is so 
resilient. Take the suicide bomber who has been a feature of many of the wars the West has 
fought since the 1980s. Rodney Stark, a sociologist of religion pointed out many years ago 
that the more demanding a religion is, the more it demands martyrs or enforces sexual 
prohibitions or even dictates which food you are allowed to eat – the more value it has for 
the devout precisely because of the sacrifices that must be made, and that the devout think 
worth making. Suicide bombers, in other words, are good both for religion and for the group. 
10 They are good for the group in providing role models; they are good for religion because 
martyrdom, as William James argued in his book The Varieties of Religious Experience, is 
one of the ‘religious appetites’ that make the brand so appealing. And they’re good for war 
because religion is one of the mechanisms which keep it going, as too is the human 
predisposition to emulate heroes, national or tribal who are willing to lay down their life for 
the nation or tribe. Throughout history nearly every society has believed that in certain 
circumstances death can be redemptive. A citizen can find meaning in his own death and 
another, seeing the sacrifice of a fellow citizen, can find her faith in life restored.   
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War and Agency (1) Tools/Technology  
None of this I hazard would have surprised Thucydides were he alive today and certainly not 
Kenneth Waltz. But did Waltz fail to take more fully into account the extent to which 
technology has shaped his three images? I will discuss the first image at length below, but 
think of the state without the technologies that enable it to communicate with its own citizens, 
or the technologies that underpin the international system. The state is merely a machine, a 
‘mega-machine’, Lewis Mumford called it, which requires a range of intellectual techniques 
to exist, such as writing/counting, which in the course of history has been replaced in turn by 
non-human computers (algorithms).  Think of the invention of ‘management’ techniques in 
the 19th century which enabled human beings to manage other human beings. 11 It also 
enabled them to socialise each other – reprogramming their skills, or in the Foucauldian 
sense, ‘disciplining’ them. And then think of the importance of information-gathering for the 
world system: think of new communications technologies that came on stream in the late 
nineteenth century: the telegraph, telephone and the radio which created a closed political 
system for the first time, one that was world-wide in scope.  
 
But the focus of this article as I have stated is Waltz’s first image: human nature. In a 2013 
article, Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden chose to take him to task on two counts.  The 
first is that he failed to understand the extent to which human beings have greater agency 
than any other species thanks to the tools and technology they use.  Now, to be sure Waltz 
recognised the importance of technology in determining human behaviour. Though not a 
determinist as such he was pretty deterministic about nuclear weapons. He is famous after 
all for insisting that we would all be better off if every state had them. He is famous –or 
infamous- after all for insisting that ‘More May be Better’ (the title of his 1981 Adelphi Paper). 
What Cudworth and Hobden meant was that he had no developed theory of agency except 
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for the sense that our unique biology and invention of culture allow us choices that no other 
species enjoys. In other words it could be claimed that his understanding of the ‘social’ was 
limited.  For my own part I would make this critique: it’s not that Waltz paid insufficient 
attention to technology but that he continued to believe until the end of his life that the fate of 
human beings is determined largely by their relationship, not with their technology but with 
other human beings. 
 
In the thinking of Bruno Latour the ‘social’ represents more than a bonding with other people; 
it also constitutes an association between ourselves and our tools.  Ask yourself a question. 
Latour writes.  If we did not have a hammer to hammer in a nail; if we try to run a company 
without bookkeeping; if neither made a difference could we talk about agency at all?  
Agency, he adds, is what ‘allows’, ‘determines’, ‘permits’, ‘facilitates’, ‘renders possible’ or 
‘impossible’.  Unlike our social relations with other people, it does not require intentionality 
on the part of the tools or technology we use. From the first use of social tools that make 
possible social complexity (the division of labour) we went on to invent intellectual tools such 
as writing and counting that made it possible to organise human society into a mega 
machine (civilisation) before we went on to assemble machines in the industrial era that 
were ruled by laws that had a sort of ‘social life’. Sociology, insists Latour should be about 
the science of associations and not merely the science of the ‘social’; it should be about our 
relationship with non-human artefacts as well as other people. 12 
 
Today, thanks to digital technology we are enhancing our agency further by empowering 
machines to manage us.  Internet search engines for example now ‘manage’ us by reading 
our thoughts; directing us to what they think we might find more interesting (e.g. where to go 
on holiday next).  They even read our moods and try to cheer us up; they filter through what 
we read and select web sites that they think we will find more interesting.  In the case of 
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drone pilots, we now monitor their brain rhythms, heart rate and eye movements in order to 
scan their attentiveness and so ensure that they are focusing on the job. A pilot can be ‘shut 
off’ if he is thought to be getting stressed out and control transferred to others. 13 
 
Digital technology is reshaping our experience of everyday life; it is re-mastering our 
experience of time and place; it is remastering the everyday.  Code, in other words, is 
increasingly shaping our behaviour,. The individual is no longer the autonomous subject so 
often enshrined in Western thinking; instead, ‘our self-hood is smeared across a global mesh 
of nodes and links.’ 14  And what’s more, every time that we tweet or answer an email, we are 
rewiring our neuro-transmitter pathways, lighting up the reward circuits of our brain. Digital 
technology is so addictive for that reason. 15  
 
The networking between man and machine for example is also getting us to spend less and 
less time with other people. Immanuel Kant argued that war had a teleological purpose: 
asocial sociability.  It is an appeal to Waltz’s third image. War introduced people to other 
people, civilisations and societies; it forced them to trade and work with each other, and one 
day would transform them into global citizens.  It hasn’t worked out like that.  Many people 
now live in cyber-ghettoes, in epistemic communities, talking to like-minded people; they use 
chat rooms to exchange their own conspiracy theories and paranoid delusions.  Humans are 
as estranged from each other as ever.     
 
 And here is another thought.  When it comes to actually targeting other people the military 
may eventually come to trust machines to make tactical decisions.  And it is trust – what 
sociologists call ‘social capital’ – that makes us such a distinctive species. We co-operate far 
more effectively than any other. Trust however is what makes war possible. And distrust 
makes it so resilient.  The original security dilemma theorists took this to be the ultimate 
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tragedy of the human condition. Any tool in another person’s hands can be used as a 
weapon; and because we can’t read another person’s thoughts, we can’t read their 
intentions.  
 
The digital age is another stage on our evolutionary road-map. To understand the way in 
which it is also transforming war let’s go back to Tinbergen’s model. Take the origins of war 
and the way in which terrorism illustrates the key Clausewitzian concept of escalation: the 
propensity of war to become ‘absolute,’ to escape political control.  We have come to 
recognise that we are Homo mimetus. We are an irredeemably mimetic species. As Rene 
Girard tells us, we compete with each other in order to differentiate ourselves from each 
other but succeed only by becoming more and more embedded in a particular group.16 
People can only emerge from the crowd by becoming a particular part of another.  And they 
join the new group by copying its behaviour. In Tahrir Square (2011) the protesters could 
see their protest unfold on giant TV screens; they literally watched themselves protesting. 
These days people live–stream everything from suicides to rapes. Terrorists gain status and 
reputation by gaining ‘likes’ and getting re-tweeted.  
 
The digital world has also added to the stock of war’s cultural mechanisms. Take storytelling 
which is at the heart of war and which continues to be as critical as ever. The difference is 
that the storyline is more likely to be found in a computer game or a movie than a written 
text.   ‘If we listen closely to the voices of the modern battlefield’, writes one historian, ‘we 
can still hear quite distinctly the echoes of ancient ones... Modern warriors speak in old 
tongues and answer to the ancient gods.’17 In other words, many of us still find ourselves 
locked into the gravitational pull of the Greek myths. But these days the image has taken 
over from the text: take Rise of the Argonauts or the God of War franchise which offer a 
portal to the classical world for the young, as too do the film adaptations of Rick Riordan’s 
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Percy Jackson and the Olympians. Nothing there has changed. Or rather as DARPA insists, 
national security now requires a scientific understanding of how such stories work. The 
agency’s Narrative Networks Program explores how stories work in human brains at the 
molecular level: the ‘neuro-biological impact’ of narratives on our hormones, our brain’s 
neuro-transmitters and systems of reward processing.18   
 
Computer games are keeping war alive in the popular imagination.  In 2005 for example the 
World of Warcraft introduced a new character - a winged serpent. If it bit you then you were 
instantly infected with the plague. Some victims went home to die; others allowed 
themselves to be quarantined; but a few deliberately got infected and transported 
themselves through a portal in time to carry the plague to the enemy. In no time at all the 
Department of Homeland Security arrived to find out why some American citizens were 
prepared to become suicide terrorists. In other words computer games often encourage us 
to replicate the behaviour we observe in the real world, or to act out roles we might not wish 
to perform in real life. 
 
But perhaps, there is something else in play, something more important.  So far video 
games, have copied war, but what if war begins to copy video games and the two eventually 
converge into one?  The US Defense Department’s Strategic Capabilities Office, set up in 
2012, envisages a future in which soldiers will have at their disposal the capabilities that 
players have in today’s computer games: maps of urban areas that will show heat signatures 
of the enemy (collected by satellites or drones hovering over cities for months at a time); 
access to deep-learning algorithms that will be able to predict the enemy’s next move and 
computers that will convey detailed plans of battle.  Imagine robot snipers, or snatch teams, 
or forward monitors deciding when and where to launch an attack, on the basis of probability 
counts of likely collateral damage.  All this has arrived already in video gaming.  Now war is 
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beginning to catch up.  As the Strategic Capabilities Office observes, its chief objective is to 
ensure that war eventually becomes ‘Call of Duty for real.’ 19 
 
In terms of ontogeny war is also continuing to change in character. The philosopher Spinoza 
introduced his readers to the concept of conatus (the Latin word for ‘striving’) which is built 
around the idea that all individual things have an innate inclination to survive by enhancing 
themselves, and that as a species we exhibit this tendency more than any other because of 
our knowledge of the future.  It is the knowledge indeed that we have a future that leads to a 
pro-active pursuit of power fuelled by the often unexpressed, fear of finding ourselves on 
arrival unequal to the occasion. Future-gazing in fact is what makes us human.  Scientists 
now tell us the future is quite literally on our minds every day.20 Psychologists tell us that we 
think about the future three times more often than we think about the past.  Depression 
arises not from the memory of past abuses, but from skewed visions of the future that lead 
us to over-predict failure or rejection..  
 
Now, there are many different ways in which we can measure the evolving character of war. 
Take the use of tools - we are always seeking technological upgrades. One example is the 
bow which utilised several moving parts to transfer muscle strength into mechanical energy.  
Bows first appeared in the Neolithic era, and were followed in turn by the sling (which was 
much more difficult to operate, though far more effective).  Leap thousands of years to the 
Bronze Age, writes Malcolm Gladwell, and the heavily-armed warrior Goliath had as much 
chance of prevailing against David and his sling as any Bronze Age warrior with a sword 
would have had against an opponent armed with a .45 automatic pistol. 21 And the upgrades 
have continued to appear ever since.  We are about to see the Talos suit, with its inspiration: 
the Iron Man franchise.  We will soon see liquid body armour which will be much lighter than 
the armour worn by soldiers today.  Visit Fort Benning, Georgia, and you will find in use a 
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screen on a helmet that allows soldiers to see the entire battlefield with GPS sensors.  This 
in turn will soon be supplemented or replaced by internet contact lenses through which they 
will be able to download information on everything, a useful prop if you are on patrol in an 
urban area. 22 One of the lessons of history – in so far as history reveals them - is that we 
are involved in a permanent cognitive ‘arms race’: we are always trying to get one step 
ahead of others. In a word, we are prisoners of our own technical ingenuity.    
 
As to the function of war, the rules of Darwinian selection continue to persist.  There is no 
necessary connection between its reproductive power (its fitness from its own point of view) 
and its contribution to our own fitness.  Remember that there is no teleological end in 
evolution – no intelligent designer, no higher purpose, no end-state.  Hegel thought that war 
would end when we no longer produced warriors: when men (entirely men) no longer 
derived their humanity from it.  Now we know that women, too can derive their own humanity 
from war, and that new technologies allow them the agency to come back into the story.  It is 
not coincidental that in many Hollywood visions of the future women have become the 
embodiment of the 21st century warrior.  Like Katniss from The Hunger Games and Tris from 
the Divergent series: they are forced by the harsh conditions of a dystopian world to prove 
themselves the warriors they are. ‘Become what you are’ urged Nietzsche; and some 
women are doing just that thanks to technology; they too are increasing their agency, and 
what’s more coming back into the story.  
 
Genes allow all of us to throw a spear (a woman can do this).  Culture allowed us to go one 
better – to develop the bow and arrow, but it was at that point that war became an all-male 
activity.  Researchers tell us that women could hunt with spear-throwing devices that 
preceded bows quite as effectively as men, but they could not achieve equal mastery of 
archery which required greater upper body strength.  The switch to the bow changed the 
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status of women by acting as a catalyst for some of the sex- and age-based divisions that 
still persist in many societies today. 23 But biology is not destiny, any more than gender 
involves only performance, and the ontogeny of war has changed once again.  Women now 
make up 15% of the US Armed Forces and have won the right to engage in combat since 
2016.   And a recent scientific study has got us to challenge some previous assumptions 
even about women’s physical stamina.  A recent report found that they had even greater 
endurance over the long haul than men. 24 Another based on the results of brain-scanning 
technology found that women out-perform men in inductive reasoning and are better at 
keeping track of a fast-moving situation – in short, they tend to get less stressed out. 25    
 
War and Agency (2) Inter-species co-operation 
in their article Cudworth and Hobden also made another criticism of Waltz: his failure to see 
how human agency is enhanced by our relationship with other non-human animals.26 The 
‘social’ in other words includes animals we have domesticated and that in turn have changed 
our behaviour. And that has become much clearer since 1959 when Waltz’s generation 
thought of ourselves as the only animal with social instincts and emotional depth. We tend to 
talk down animal ‘non-rationality’ largely because we talk up machine rationality. But we now 
know that animals have consciousness and with it a fairly complex emotional life. With the 
publication of Donald Griffin’s The Question of Animal Awareness (1976) the science of 
comparative psychology was born. Thanks to it we now know that chimpanzees can 
recognise kinship between chimps that they have never met.  And we now understand that 
dogs show remarkable social intelligence in co-opting us. The relationship is a cybernetic 
one. Dolphins have been helping us fish for centuries: rounding the fish up into the nets in 
batches in exchange for getting fish back from the fishermen. They have not been taught by 
us how to do this: this behaviour has emerged over time through networking with humans. 
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Only recently have we begun to recognise how much we are inextricably intermixed in each 
other’s life stories. The domestication of animals such as dogs for example may have 
conferred an evolutionary advantage. Those who understood and had affection for domestic 
animals may have been able to win more favourable marriage partners as a proxy for skill at 
raising human offspring. 27  Networking with other animals also allowed us to get to the top of 
the food chain faster. Two very different species – humans and dogs together began the 
relentless eradication of the great majority of large land animals except in Africa.  War 
changed too when we tamed wild horses. The evidence from the abraded teeth of horse 
skeletons indicate that we first slipped a rope onto a horse’s mouth as long ago as 
3,700BCE.  Horses are what Ulrich Raulff calls ‘convertors’ that unlocked the energy in 
plants and made it available for our use.  As draft animals they were ‘oat-powered engines’, 
a single horse was able to deliver roughly 7 times the power of a single man.  The paradox 
of human – equine collaboration is that one mammal domesticated another even though the 
goals of the former ran contrary to the latter’s nature as a flight animal by harnessing its 
instinct to flee into directed movement including military attack.  Horses in war also gave us 
the experience of speed while at the same time opening up space for colonisation and 
empire-building.   
 
And our reliance on them persisted for much longer than we think. Visit the Animal War 
Memorial outside Hyde Park which commemorates those killed in man-made conflicts and 
you also see how much we relied on animals in prosecuting the two world wars.  The 
German Army mobilised 1.8m horses in the First World War, and 2.7m in the Second – one 
for every 4 soldiers.  Hitler’s invasion of Russia required more horses than Napoleon’s. And 
the casualty figures for the horses were much higher.  About two-thirds of them perished. 28 
In other words, we should see the non-human as part of a network.  This does not make 
horses agents in the way that we are, any more than machines are intentional agents, but 
both have enhanced our own agency in historically ground-breaking ways. 
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Artificial intelligence: the fourth image? 
Now to the last question – what will it be like to be human when we share the planet with 
intelligence higher than our own?  Should we see Artificial Intelligence as a Fourth Image to 
use Waltz’s methodology?  If we may still need war, will war still need us? 
  
AI is already transforming our lives.  Companies are using it to manage stock indexes in 
order to optimise tax strategies and balance holdings between different portfolios.  The 
professional money manager does this once a year; AI does it every day.  Last year one IT 
company in Hong Kong put an algorithm on its main board. 29 But we must not mistake 
competence for comprehension, adds Dennett. 30 We hard-wire competencies into machines 
that have no need to understand.  Take smart elevators that can independently optimise 
their trajectories, saving time and energy.  They can automatically adjust their velocity to 
minimise discomfort to their passengers.  And remember that they do all this without neurons 
or sense organs or other organic components of brains.  They may well be highly competent, 
but it is a competence that does not require either comprehension, or consciousness.31 
 
For the moment the debate about AI revolves around the question of whether it will enhance 
or reduce human agency.  What will it do, for example, for ‘meaningful human control’ asks 
the International Committee for the Red Cross and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots.  By 
that they mean the ‘manual over-ride switch’: we retain human control when we take ultimate 
responsibility for our actions and not subcontract decision making (for example what and 
who to target) to a computer. But, then again, might we be able one day to build a 
‘conscience’ into a robot, giving it a set of ethical protocols like our own biologically 
engineered moral heuristics as the US military have been trying to do since 2007? And 
would this constitute a ‘moral upgrade’ that will compensate for the fact that in war 
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‘meaningful human control’ is a contested concept.  Think of revenge attacks for high friendly 
losses; or our tendency to dehumanise the enemy using racial or ethnic filters; or the 
deployment of inexperienced or poorly-trained troops; or the issuing of unclear orders; or 
even, regrettably, the pleasure that some soldiers derive from killing.   
 
‘Simply being human is the weakest point in the kill chain’, writes one roboticist; ‘our biology 
works against us.’33 As evolutionary biologists like to tell us we still are lumbered with Stone 
Age brains that as the psychologist Jonas Kaplan observes, make us feel compelled to 
defend not only the physical but the psychological self. Individual fact-based persuasion 
doesn’t have much impact against the much more fundamental forces of belonging and 
identity – facts are much less likely to change minds than to provide gratifying reinforcement 
of pre-existing opinions that we happen to share with other people. 34 For that reason, we 
are still victims of group think, confirmation bias, cognitive dissonance and premature 
cognitive closure – the vices that social psychologists tell us are hardwired into us by natural 
selection. Unfortunately, they did not develop so that we could get things right. They were 
designed in so that we could take sides.  They were products of group selection: anything 
that reinforces the unity of the tribe against enemies, real or imagined is good for the 
group.35  
 
Robots, by contrast – or we are often told - won’t suffer from cognitive dissonance, any more 
than they will have to wrestle with the fight or flight dynamic hard-wired into the species.  
Further technological advances in electro-optics and acoustics will make them more resilient 
still, providing them with broader oversight (and possibly even greater insight) into what is 
actually happening on the ground.  They also won’t be prone to psychological problems such 
as ‘scenario fulfilment’ – the way in which cognitive dissonance reinforces pre-existing belief 
patterns.  And they will be able to process information faster than we can.  Indeed, given the 
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increasing speed and tempo of battle, we are increasingly liable to information overload and 
all its consequent permutations, including premature cognitive closure.  If that is the case 
why not subcontract war-making to silicon life forms whose actions won’t be determined by 
the needs of in-group solidarity. All this of course may well be a typical case of wishful 
thinking?  
 
Of course, the ‘moral upgrade’ that scientists like Ray Kurtzweil tells us that autonomous 
weapon systems will bring to the battlefield begs the question whether the upgrade will only 
be as ethically effective as the programs their human programmers choose to give them – 
until the time that they can re-programme themselves? And robotic intelligence does not 
need to be superior to our own or even particularly smart in order to be extremely 
dangerous. It needs only to have been given the authority – autonomy if you will – to make 
important life or death decision. The real danger may lie in outsourcing more and more key 
decisions to machines that are not nearly as intelligent as ourselves. 
 
One day however they may well be much more intelligent than we could ever aspire to be. 
Or perhaps not: scientists cannot agree. We still don’t know when or whether machines will 
attain consciousness because we still don’t know what consciousness is. Integrated 
information Theory (IIT) postulates that consciousness is the way information feels when 
processed in certain complex ways. In other words it’s an ‘emergent phenomenon’ whose 
complex behaviour emerges from many simple interactions. In similar terms physicists and 
chemists have found that atoms behave in different ways depending on the patterns in which 
they’re arranged. The key difference between a solid, liquid and gas, for example, lies not in 
the types of atoms but in their arrangement. Boiling or freezing a liquid simply rearranges 
them. 
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But if machines do achieve self-consciousness what then? Will the machines save us or 
destroy us?  It may well depend on our time perspective. If we take the long-term we might 
ask, invoking the language of Brexit, whether we are in for a soft or a hard Singularity – the 
term that scientists use for the moment that the machines will gain self-consciousness?  Will 
we co-exist together, and evolve a means of complex inter-dependence in a way that we 
cannot yet imagine?  Pinker, for one, insists that there is no reason to think that a super-
intelligent computer would ever be psychopathic.  Psychopaths after all, are thoroughly 
human: they are products of natural selection shaping testosterone-sensitive circuits in a 
certain species of primate – ourselves. 36  
 
But here is another alternative which I derive from Paul Davies’ book The Eerie Silence in 
which he provides one explanation for why we have not received the signatures of 
intelligence from an alien civilisation both older and superior to ourselves.  If like us, they are 
biological life-forms, they will almost certainly not be able to undertake space travel.  The 
distances and hazards from radiation will conspire to make space travel possible only for 
robots.  And over the millennia the robots they have dispatched into space may have 
evolved a super-intelligence; they will be far more interested in exploring their own inner 
intellectual landscapes than the physical space that attracts biological life.  Inter-planetary 
space will be their preferred arena where they can reconstruct themselves, and where their 
non-biological brains may develop insights far beyond our imagining.  In other words, if they 
exist at all they are probably to be found parked in the deepest recesses of the Universe 
where they may be spending most of their time proving ever more subtle mathematical 
theorems. 37 So, perhaps, one day, the autonomous killer machines that we build may simply 
go on strike and take us out of the war business.  There won’t be a fourth image through 
which to study the causes of war. This may well constitute a major lack of agency but one 
that may allow us to escape the security dilemma and force us to co-exist with each other on 
more positive terms.    
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But the day that machines can think for themselves is a long way off; some scientists believe 
it will never arrive. Until then we and our machines will be coexisting, perhaps somewhat 
uneasily, as they cease to be tools and become collaborators.  And if in the short term the 
machines do go rogue we may only have ourselves to blame. We are already programming 
them to lie to us (who wants a nurse bot in a battlefield situation to tell you that you are not 
going to make it back to the field hospital in time); recently an algorithm on Facebook began 
to lie independently of its program, by observing the behaviour of its human users.38 The 
most depressing prospect of all, I would suggest is the day that our machines begin copying 
our own behaviour on the understanding that this is what humans do; that war as 
Thucydides thought is very much ‘the human thing’ and that they should help us to wage it 
more effectively than ever.   
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